

STRENGTHENING SOLIDARITY. A COHERENT EUROPEAN COMMITMENT TO MIGRATION

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ABSTRACT: *The recent understanding between the European Union and Tunisia led to a Memorandum, one of the main objectives of which is to regulate and limit the flow of migrants leaving the Tunisian coast. The direct intervention of Brussels can be read as an attempt to definitively give a shared Union policy in the reception of migrants arriving from North Africa. That would allow for a more consistent application of that subsidiarity necessary to harmonise member states' policies, supporting in this action the intervention of the CJEU, which is at the forefront of defending and correctly applying EU principles. The necessity to harmonise comes from the European geopolitical interest in having a diplomatic dialogue with the African States in a period where the Russian presence and the African enthusiasm for Moscow could be a risk for Europe and the continuation of the Russian-Ukrainian war.*

KEYWORDS: *EU-Tunisia Memorandum; solidarity principle; CJEU; shared policy; European geopolitics.*

JEL CODE: *K33, K37.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The migration phenomenon affecting Europe has now acquired a decidedly transnational dimension. Confirmation of this nature comes from the evolution of migration, which has seen an increase in the number of people making these journeys and in the number of routes followed to reach our continent (starting from Africa or Asia).

Over the years, the European Union has tried to cope with the flow of migrants arriving on its territory in different ways, trying to provide a shared solution that could satisfy the positions and interests of the member states, which have been different and often irreconcilable.

Today, we can see the presence of two routes affecting Europe, the Mediterranean and the Balkan. The latter has the Middle East as its starting point and is mainly fuelled by Syrians fleeing civil war and has seen as its solution the externalisation of European migration policy towards Turkey (the famous EU-Turkey dialogue of 2016). The Mediterranean route, on the other hand, has seen southern European countries (Spain, Italy, Malta and Greece) at the forefront and is the one that has caused the most friction and

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problems in the European Parliament in the attempt to regulate the management of these flows and responsibility over asylum seekers.

The difficulties in finding a legislative solution that satisfies all European positions are often caused by divergent national interests of Member States, which sometimes defend their interests by violating Union agreements and commitments in ensuring principles such as free movement of persons or have legislation that does not hinder or make it more difficult to grant asylum. The resolution of these "internal" problems is resolved by the Court of Justice, which is working hard to defend the principles and values of the TEU and the TFEU. In addition to this defensive Union legal bulwark, a shared policy is also needed to facilitate the position of member countries most exposed to migration.

For these reasons, the direct intervention of the European Union in Tunisia was significant because it showed the Union's interest in trying to stem one of the main points of migration to Europe. In particular, Tunisia has been one of the countries most affected by the Coronavirus pandemic due to a malfunctioning national health system. The consequent lockdown measures adopted have led to the collapse of the already poor national economy based mainly on small trade domestic and tourism (Sbailò 2022).

In addition to economic and health difficulties, Tunisia is also going through a complicated political and institutional phase with the autocratic drift of the power of President Saïed. That has also affected the migrant population of West Africa (Ivory Coast and Mali) that reached Tunisia to sail to Europe. There have been numerous appeals from the EU and the UN to stop the climate of hatred and racism against migrants. Between March and May, in Tunisia, we witnessed ethnic substitution operations (through raids) and violence against foreigners (Amnesty International report, 20/07/2023). Moreover, this situation has also encouraged illegal immigrations from Tunisia to escape arbitrary detentions such as those in Ouardia (Nicoli 2023).

These economic, social and political factors have led the European Union to intervene by means of an international agreement. The memorandum signed in July has two aspects. The first relates to the support of the southern Member States, calling for the necessary European solidarity given the overcrowding of reception centres. The second, however, concerns the presence of a European geopolitical interest in the dialogue with Tunisia. The Russian presence in Africa and the growing support from some African countries could lead Moscow to be able to influence migratory flows according to the political opportunities arising from the course of the war in Ukraine.

Given this continental and international political scenario, we will examine how action to enhance European solidarity can move towards greater coherence. In particular, through a micro-comparison we will look at the evolution of the European agreements on migrants from Africa. Finally, with a macro-comparison we will analyse how this action conforms to that of the European Court of Justice committed to the national legislation harmonisation on reception and asylum procedures.

2. THE NORTH AFRICAN MIGRATORY FRONT AND ITS REGULATION

The migratory flow from North Africa represents a phenomenon that has evolved and complicated over the years.

In the 1990s, departures from the Mediterranean area of Africa were focused on a few countries (particularly Morocco and Nigeria) and Spain and Italy were the most frequently

reached destinations. The first European legal regulation is the Dublin Convention. This agreement was signed in 1990, activated in 1997 and provided that the European country of first entry handled asylum requests. The spirit of Dublin was supposed to follow that of Schengen. Time has shown that it failed to replicate that spirit of sharing and commonality in the European public space.

The first-country-of-arrival criterion does not seem fair for geographical reasons and would only place the responsibility for European borders on certain countries. Furthermore, being registered in the first country of arrival means that a migrant cannot apply for asylum in other member states (B. Garcés-Mascareñas, 2015). The Convention represents a contradiction and reflects the ambiguous European view of freedom of movement (Wihtol de Wenden, 2011). Indeed, in terms of domestic policy, Europe has succeeded in establishing the principle of free movement, it has not done the same for people from outside. In this case, it has placed protection around the continent that has been the fortress of and for Europe (Carr, 2016).

After the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the issue of asylum became a communitarian competence thanks to the second version of the Dublin Convention in 2003. Therefore, the regulation covered all member states and four others (Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland). Regulation 343/2003 (also referred to as Dublin II) was a way to give to the first Convention a communitarian spirit (G. Morgese, 2020). It provided for the principle of non-refoulement, respect for the rights of the Nice Charter in regard to migrants and that all member countries consider themselves as safe countries. Mutual trust between EU states is the main point of this agreement. Also, this version confirmed the first-country-of-arrival principle with the aim of avoiding 'asylum shopping'.

Finally, we had the Dublin III Regulation (604/2013). This new version reformed the most critical profiles of the past regulations. This final version provided for an early warning, preparedness and crisis management system. An interesting point comes from the 'sovereignty clause'. This clause made member states responsible for an asylum application even in derogation of the principles of the regulation. Among the principles, we also have the banning of applying for asylum in more than one country. The examination of the application continues to be in the first receiving country.

The Dublin Convention has been the object of harsh criticism, especially about its endemic malfunctioning by international agencies too. The critics came from the European Refugee Council and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. One of its systemic failures lies in the unequal imbalance between Member States. The pressure is on the countries where refugees first arrive, such as Italy and Greece (Valenta and others., 2019). Furthermore, the Dublin States de facto rarely transfer asylum seekers back to the responsible State. Some critics also point out that the Convention does not consider the personal motivation of an asylum-seeking and the country where a person would like to live (Barbou des Places, 2004). From the UN view point, these reasons made Dublin Convention unfair.

The beginning of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and its evolution from a migratory perspective led to new proposals in the EU. In 2011, Italy and France suggested revising the rules of the Schengen acquis in order to modify the principles of free movement of people in the territory in light of the increase of landings in Europe. In 2015, Europe reached the highest point with more than one million immigrants from North Africa.

That very year, however, some countries (including Germany, Croatia, Slovakia, Hungary and Austria) decided to close their borders. Also, in 2015, the EU realised the need to think about and implement a model for receiving asylum seekers on its territory that went beyond the logic that inspired the three Dublin Conventions (we refer to the so-called first-country-of-arrival principle). That led to the proposal of the 'Migration Agenda', an agreement with a five-year plan for the implementation of compulsory but flexible European solidarity. The aim was to see the involvement of member states in the relocation of asylum seekers on European territory or in the provision of funds to support the action of countries receiving such individuals. This proposal never received a firm consensus among member states and was never implemented.

This programme was drawn up because of the failure to implement solidarity. In particular, this proposal had a huge problem about the obsolescence of the five-year plans about the migration problem resolution (De Bruycker, 2022).

Later, in 2018, Bulgaria (as rotating president of the Council of Europe) proposed a compromise between the different national positions. The refugee reception system would have been voluntary. Countries that opposed reception would have had to pay 30,000 euros for each person who refused. Opposition from many countries caused this proposal to be dropped. These included the Baltic countries, those of the Visegrad group, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and France.

In 2020, the New Pact on Migration and Asylum was proposed to manage and normalise migration in the long term. The final intention is also to create a common approach to migration and asylum based on solidarity, responsibility and respect for human rights. The main points of the agreement concerned a European mechanism for migration crisis preparedness and management. It also provided for cooperation on search and rescue and a voluntary solidarity mechanism. In this case, 23 countries agreed to support those most under pressure from a migration perspective.

The new pact brought a significant innovation, the application of solidarity (Article 80 TFEU), in a mandatory and flexible manner. For flexibility, Member States may choose to relocate asylum seekers, either to sponsor return or to provide other types of aid or funding and even external cooperation for migration management in migrants' countries of origin or transit.

We can say that this New Pact failed to seize the opportunity to create and develop a shared policy. We can have this kind of policy with common legislation shared by all Member states with common objectives. For that, direct involvement of the European Parliament would be necessary as a privileged forum for a debate that concerns all Member states at the same time.

As indicated in Abdou's analysis (2021), we cannot describe as accidental the lack of consensus in determining a policy of reception and also of integration shown in this agreement. The real problem with some European policies is that they ignore that reception on EU territory is only the first point after integration.

The last attempt, in chronological order, was in June 2023. At the EU Home Affairs Council, member states agreed to approve two legislative packages on border management procedures and asylum seekers. These two pieces of legislation will, if approved by the European Parliament, become part of the Migration Pact and provide for a compulsory solidarity mechanism (or the giving of EUR 20,000 for each asylum seeker not relocated) in the case of large numbers of arrivals and a redefinition of safe third countries.

We have to wait for the response of the Parliament to see whether this umpteenth proposal will be able to deliver to Europe a shared regulation on the reception of asylum seekers that satisfies the different positions of the member states.

3. FROM HARMONISATION ATTEMPTS TO OUTSOURCING AGREEMENTS

The various agreements to regulate asylum claims coherently and in a shared way have been accompanied by a new and different European political strategy to limit the flow of migrants arriving on the continent. Faced with the growing transnationality of the migratory phenomenon, the EU has attempted to give a unified response by trying to overcome the principle of the first country of arrival. The intention was to have a holistic approach (Radjenovic, 2019).

Since 2016, the EU has started externalising its migration policy by involving third countries with agreements or partnerships (mostly soft law instruments) that would support the EU's migration interests.

The first evidence of this European policy comes from the 'EU-Turkey declaration' of March 2016. Further evidence of such externalisation and devolution by the EU came in February 2017 with the 'Malta Declaration'. In this case, the European Council stated the EU's need to train and equip the Libyan coastguard in order to stop human traffickers, increase rescue operations and prevent departures from the coasts with vessels unable to sustain the central Mediterranean trade.

Externalising the migration issue and European borders is a choice that could be explained by the terrorist attacks that have hit the EU since 2015. These events led to a tightening of national sanctions against people illegally present in European countries or caught entering them clandestinely (Umansky, 2016).

The agreements signed under this paradigm presented a link between three points: the fight against terrorism, the commitment to security and the fight against migration in exchange for aid (Limam and Del Sarto, 2015).

Among the most significant agreements involving outsourcing, we mention two: the one between the EU and Turkey (2016) and the one between Italy and Libya (2017).

In March 2016, Brussels and Ankara concluded an agreement providing the swift return of irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters. Among the migrants Turkey was supposed to receive, the provision included who wants to arrive in Greece and who does not need international protection. Furthermore, Turkey committed to legislate to prevent the arrival of further irregular migrants on Greek territory, especially on islands, and to cooperate with the EU in this direction.

However, Turkey has a geographical limitation on the 1951 Refugee Convention application for non-European asylum seekers. In fact, Ankara only grants refugee status as defined by the Convention to people from a Council of Europe member country. This situation seems to make any possibility of applying for and receiving protection for refugees from non-European countries unrealistic. Syrian refugees and asylum seekers who are removed from Greece to Turkey can access the 'temporary protection regime', even though some NGOs (Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) have reported detentions and mistreatment of these individuals.

After the failed military coup attempt in July 2016 and the authoritarian turn of Turkish policies, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe declared that returning to Turkey (as the first country of asylum) could lead to the violation of EU and international law as Ankara does not provide sufficient protection. Subsequently, relations between the EU and Turkey suffered frictions and rifts that led Erdoğan to repeatedly threaten to open the so-called 'gates of Europe'.

Words were followed by deeds. Towards the end of February 2020, the Turks opened the gates of their national border with Greece as a sign of provocation to Europe, which was accused of, among other things, not engaging enough in Syria. The episode that led to this event was the Russian attack on Turkish forces in the canton of Idlib, with the risk of a new humanitarian catastrophe looming. The European Union also had to resume talks with Turkey because data provided by the European Commission showed a 97% (Giannotta, 2021) decrease in irregular arrivals in Europe from the Middle East in 2019, thus testifying to the effectiveness of this partnership.

With reference to the agreement between Italy and Libya, here we had the application of a different strategy by the EU. We can say that there was a delegation to Italy to talk to Tripoli to limit the flow of migrants from Libya. Italy could use European funds to reach the targets of the Memorandum and help Libya. In the agreement, the parties declare themselves determined to work to address all challenges that adversely affect the peace, security and stability of the two countries and the Mediterranean region in general. In this regard, they identify common threats such as illegal immigration and its impact on the national social fabric, the fight against terrorism, human trafficking and fuel smuggling. This engagement takes into account the sensitivity of the political transition phase in Libya and the need to continue supporting efforts towards national reconciliation.

The few articles present some specific obligations for Italy and others common to both parties.

In particular, according to Article 1, Italy is called upon to launch cooperation initiatives in support of security and military institutions, to finance growth programmes in the Libyan regions most affected by illegal immigration (such as in the field of renewable energy, infrastructure, health or personnel training) and to provide technical and technological support to Libyan bodies in charge of countering illegal immigration. Under Article 2, there are mutual obligations. Both countries undertake to complete the control system of the land borders in southern Libya, to adapt and finance reception centres through Italian and European economic resources, to train Libyan personnel within these centres and to support international organisations operating in Libyan territory. Finally, the two states will work together to propose, within three months of the signing of the Memorandum, a more comprehensive and wide-ranging Euro-African cooperation vision to eliminate the causes of illegal immigration, support the countries from which the migratory phenomenon originates and raise the level of service sectors to improve living standards and conditions.

This agreement was also harshly criticised in Italy and Europe. At the national level, the ASGI (Association for Legal Studies on Immigration) pointed out the failure to respect the proxy agreement (Article 80 of the Constitution), which provides for the ratification by Parliament of international treaties or agreements that provide financial burdens on the State. On the Union level, on the other hand, Italy was accused of non-compliance with the last paragraph of Article 78 and Article 218 of the TFEU about the possibility of the

European Parliament participating in the procedure of drafting the inter-institutional agreement. However, the latter has characteristics of soft law by which, in the absence of a legally binding nature, the European Parliament's scrutiny is limited.

This agreement was signed despite Libya's peculiar position in the international arena on the fundamental rights defence. In fact, Tripoli is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention but is a signatory to the 1966 UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the 1984 Convention against Torture. Similarly to the Turkish case, the need for regulation with Libya allowed these situations to go beyond, despite their relevance.

As shown through the dates of the signed agreements, the European externalisation policy did not present itself as an alternative to attempts to build a shared European migration policy. On the contrary, it can be said that the externalisation agreements have played a relevant role for the EU. They have made it possible to understand the scope and incidence of the migration phenomenon in certain geographical points of the EU.

4. THE EU-TUNISIA PARTNERSHIP

In July 2023, in Tunis, Tunisian President Saied received an EU delegation represented by Ursula Von Der Leyen (President of the Commission), Giorgia Meloni (Italian Prime Minister) and Mark Rutte (Dutch Prime Minister). On the table was the proposal of an agreement for a Euro-Tunisian memorandum.

That was not the first time of an institutional dialogue between the EU and the North African country.

In the past, we have seen other agreements.

In March 2011, the European Commission and the High Representative issued a joint declaration on the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean and, in May of the same year, a new document entitled 'A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood' was published. The latter included a European commitment to support the aspirations of North African citizens for change, presenting this commitment as an obligation stemming from Europe's legal and political experience in the field.

Subsequent commitments with Tunis attempted to address the exodus of thousands of people leaving North Africa (Tunisia and Libya in particular) with final destinations in Malta and Italy.

Subsequently, in March 2014, the EU and Tunisia signed a mobility partnership with the aim of facilitating the movement of persons in the EU and Tunisian territories and promoting joint and responsible management of migration flows by simplifying visa procedures. With this agreement, the EU also decided to support the Tunisian authorities in the protection of refugees and asylum seekers and, in general, to better address the challenges of the Mediterranean.

With reference to diplomatic relations with Tunisia, we recall the adoption of the document '*Consolider le partenariat privilégié UE - Tunisie: priorités stratégiques pour la période 2018-2020*'. Through the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, this agreement provided for a mutual commitment to strengthen cooperation over the years on security, counter-terrorism, migration and mobility. Furthermore, we read that anchoring to the EU is a strategy chosen by Tunisia, whose democratisation of the political system is also of strategic interest to Brussels. That showed a double connection between these two political players. The following pages of the agreement envisaged the coordinated

management of migration by providing for a Tunisian national migration strategy's implementation and the guarantee of good governance of legal migration through coordination with EU member states to guarantee a better integration of migrants in the receiving countries. With regard to security and terrorism, on the other hand, the European Union obtained a commitment from Tunisia to implement its own comprehensive and multi-sectoral strategy to fight terrorism and violent national extremism in order to, among the various objectives listed, support the implementation of the national border security strategy.

However, with regard to the July 2023 Memorandum of Understanding, we have to start with the presence of five pillars that define the structure of the agreement. These are macroeconomic stability, trade and investment, green energy transition, people-to-people relations and migration. In addition, the agreement also envisages cooperation in identifying and addressing what is defined as common international challenges.

With regard to migration, the two sides expressed their intention to develop a holistic approach. They both agree on the link between migration and development, which makes it possible to highlight the benefits of migration in terms of social growth and rapprochement between peoples. This vision could be the key to finding a solution to the root causes of Tunisia's irregular migration. In this regard, the parties undertake to promote sustainable development in the poorest and most emigration-affected areas, supporting the empowerment and employability of people belonging to the most vulnerable groups through support for vocational training, employment and private initiative.

On irregular migration, the text of the Memorandum mentions that Tunisia intends to guard its borders by guaranteeing respect for human rights and ensuring an effective fight against criminal networks of migrant and human traffickers. These objectives require, as set out in the Enhanced Operational Partnership against Smuggling of Migrants and Trafficking, effective border management and the development of a system for the identification and return (to their countries of origin) of irregular migrants already present in Tunisia.

Another point of the agreement relates to the Euro-Tunisian synergy in coordinating sea rescue operations. In particular, the EU will strive to provide adequate additional financial support to further improve Tunisian national border management. Furthermore, cooperation will also be present in the repatriation and readmission from the EU of Tunisian irregular nationals (in compliance with international standards and human dignity) and in the reintegration of these into the Tunisian socio-economic structure.

Alongside the fight against illegal migration, the two sides take on the task of fostering regular migration channels through the promotion of seasonal employment opportunities and the adoption of appropriate measures to facilitate the granting of visas and thus reduce delays, costs and administrative procedures.

A final very significant aspect that marks a significant paradigm shift from what we have seen in previous agreements with Tunisia or Libya is the specification of a commitment that the EU makes. We read that the EU will also support and facilitate the implementation of the Memorandum in bilateral agreements involving Member States on return and readmission.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The European institutional and political context outlined in the previous paragraphs has shown how, in the past, the European Union was divided between national particularisms and union interests.

The lack, even today, of a common and shared European legislation on asylum seekers from North Africa has become a problem that the EU has decided to tackle head-on, given the current characteristics of the international political and geopolitical scenario.

The intensification of the migration phenomenon, the growing and strong Russian and Chinese presence in African politics, economics and society, and the Russo-Ukrainian war suggested direct intervention by Brussels. Moreover, the EU has also learnt lessons from the Arab Spring phenomenon and the political and institutional crisis in Libya. In 2011, the military intervention in Tripoli by the UK and France led to the end of the Gaddafi regime without a political alternative for the North African country. Even today, Libya is still a theatre of instability and lack of unity.

The agreement with Tunisia of the disputed and autocratic Saied is the European attempt to support a form of national government as long as it is able to stand and function.

This European political strategy must be able to overcome national and regional particularisms in the EU.

Looking at the increase of the migration phenomenon and its growing transnationality, it is no longer possible to limit European commitments regarding asylum seekers and migrants to the intervention of the European Court of Justice alone.

Subsequent intervention by the Court to correct the legislative distortions of Member States seeking to escape international reception burdens is no longer possible. In this regard, we cite two very recent judgments against Austria (2022) and Hungary (2023). Concerning the Austrian case (C-368/20 and C-369/20), the Court had to intervene in incorrect activation of the border police reactivation clauses in the Schengen acquis. On the other hand, for the Hungarian case (C-823/21), the Court condemned Budapest for unjustifiably making the procedure for granting asylum to applicants more burdensome, resulting in the non-refoulement principle violation.

In both cases, the two countries had failed in their European commitments in the name of public order and defence of their borders and the interests of their population. The Court intervened recalling the burden of respecting union agreements and the need to guarantee rights to those who legitimately enter Europe and apply for asylum (Article 6, Directive 32/2013).

It's time to go beyond national interests also for economic migrants or asylum seekers from North Africa.

The need for a definitive Union intervention in the regulation of migratory flows and asylum requests from countries has a significant point in soft law negotiations and agreements with countries and governments that are very sensitive to respect for human rights. However, a significant breakthrough comes from European legislation on the reception of Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war.

Directive 382/2022 regulated the redistribution of Ukrainian refugees to all member countries. The objective of this measure was to help countries close to the war border (in particular Poland and Romania) and to support the human flow out of Ukraine, which according to Eurostat data involves 8 million people.

This Directive derives from Directive 55/2001, written for two reasons. The first, the most imminent, was the need to regulate the exodus of thousands of Kosovars entering Europe. The second, with a future perspective, stemmed from the strong need to realise a shared European reception policy. This necessity came the Member States welcomed 500.000 Bosnian refugees in 1992 on the basis of agreements that had been implemented at the time.

Apart from differences in time and international political assumptions, the two directives make a fundamental difference. That of 2001 refers to a solidarity that is suggested as a system to dialogue with the authorities of the Member States to help each other in the management of human flows arriving in Europe. Instead, 2022 refers to mandatory solidarity.

Why this difference from 2001 to 2022?

We can explain this difference by arguing that the much larger number of Ukrainian refugees (more than eight times as many as the Bosnians) put more pressure on the EU (Van Selm, 2022). A further explanation can come from the fact that the European Union has learned from the legislative difficulties in the regulation of migration flows from North Africa and intervened by providing in the first place a mechanism of mandatory solidarity that led to an intervention strong and unified European (Kortukova and others, 2022).

Another point is the nature of asylum claims by Ukrainians. In this case, we assume that these individuals will return to their country after the end of the war (Skordas, 2022), just as it was for the Bosnians in the aftermath of the end of the Balkan war. That would have made the governments of the member states more willing to accept mandatory solidarity.

A possible justification behind the imposition of compulsory solidarity could also relate to the European geopolitical interest in the events that led to these migration flows.

The Balkan War was the first conflict in Europe since the Second World War and the first since the birth of a united Europe. This conflict had visible and defined borders; its political interests were delimited to the Balkan area. On the other hand, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict brings very significant interest to the European Union. The Russian threat on the continent has already pushed the EU towards previously unexplored policies (Sbailò, 2023) regarding a shared European army defence against cyber threats, as demonstrated by the adoption of the European Strategic Compass.

Because of Moscow's attack, the EU has privileged and is continuing to privilege its geopolitical side, as an international player that has to defend its interests and political strategies.

From this point of view, the choice of direct intervention by Brussels in Africa with the signing of the Memorandum in Tunisia does not appear accidental.

Today, Africa represents a dangerous meeting point between the geopolitical interests and international plans of China and Russia. Putin announced the cancellation of 23 billion of African debt to Moscow and he increased Russian sustain from African countries. Moreover, Wagner's influence in the political dynamics of the Sahel could lead Russia to push migration towards Europe in an uncontrolled and dangerous way.

A Union response today (pending the European Parliament's decision on the 2023 proposal for a shared policy on asylum seekers) could strengthen the EU in the face of the challenges of an increasingly globalised and interconnected world also in terms of threats and risks.

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